KONFRONTASI AND THE MAKING OF MALAYSIA: BRITISH RESPONSES

ONFRONTASI AND THE MAKING OF MALAYSIA:
BRITISH RESPONSES

Yeow Tong Chia
Ph.D student
University of Toronto
yeowtong.chia@utoronto.ca

Paper presentation at CCSEAS conference, October 15, 2005 at York
University

The speech given by Tunku Abdul Rahman on May 1961 is often seen as
the turning point in the formation of Malaysia. The Tunku’s idea of
Malaysia dovetailed with the British “Grand Design” for the
decolonization of their remaining colonial possessions in Southeast
Asia. This set off a chain of events, which culminated in the
formation of Malaysia in September 1963. In fact, the major details on
Malaysia were supposedly worked out by December 1962, and 31 August
1963 was fixed as the date for Malaysia Day.
When the idea of Malaysia was first proposed, it drew lukewarm
response from Indonesia. In fact, Indonesia initially welcomed the
idea, as noted in a speech given by its foreign minister, Dr.
Subandrio at the United Nations in November 1961.  This initial
support transformed into hostility and finally Konfrontasi by 1963.
 In retrospect, Konfrontasi did not stop the formation of Malaysia.
However, documents from the Public Records Office (PRO) and the
Australian Archives reveal concern on the part of the British (and
even Malaya) that the whole Malaysia project could potentially be
called off. The British on their part feared that Konfrontasi might
frustrate their “grand design” to decolonise in the Borneo
territories. Also, fears of Konfrontasi escalating into a hot war
forced the British to maintain and even increase their military
presence in the region, leading to further accusations of Malaysia
being a neo-colonialist plot.
The expressed objective of the first phase of Konfrontasi was to stop
the formation of Malaysia until the wishes of the Borneo residents
were ascertained in a UN supervised plebiscite. While Indonesia failed
to prevent the formation of Malysia, it managed to “internationalize”
the Malaysia issue and thereby threaten to abort the plan. The role
and responses of the British in this episode had significant impact on
the outcome of the events.
A survey of the historiography of Konfrontasi reveals a proliferation
of works on the topic. However focuses mainly on the motive and causes
behind Konfrontasi. The reasons have aptly been categorised by Mackie
as "expansionist, diversionist, or ideological".  The
de-classification of Australian documents in recent years has led to
excellent official histories on the involvement of Australia in the
conflict. In contrast, the role of the British in Konfrontasi has been
largely neglected until recently.  Works touching on the role of the
British during Konfrontasi tend to focus on security interests.  Thus,
the conventional view was that the British response to Konfrontasi was
primarily a military one, since it was successful in thwarting the
military threat posed by Indonesia throughout the course of
Konfrontasi.
 As mentioned hitherto, the British intended the establishment of
Malaysia to be uneventful. With the ending of the Emergency by 1960,
there was no indication of hostilities, especially with the cautious
welcome of the Malaysia proposal by Indonesia. Nonetheless, by
mid-1962, suspicion of Indonesian designs on the Borneo Territories
was mentioned in the British Cabinet. However, it was felt that
"Indonesia's claim to New Guinea" and "political disunity" made such
designs at best a remote possibility. 
 Signs of possible conflict emerged by September 1962 with censorious
remarks made by Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Chairman of the PNI, on the
Malaysia proposal. He stated that "Indonesia would not remain
indifferent to the formation of Malaysia" and alleged that foreign
military bases might be set up in Borneo.  This drew strong reactions
from the Tunku, who curtly remarked, "Everyone is free to follow
developments in Malaysia but I must categorically say, keep your hands
off our affairs".  Dr. Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Minister,
heightened tensions by his statements to The Straits Times to the
effect that Indonesia would take counter actions if a military base
(especially United States) was established in Borneo: "If it is an
American base… we shall then arrange for a Soviet base in our part of
Borneo".
 In contrast to the Tunku, the British dismissed the Indonesian
statements as mere rhetoric. Sir Leslie Fry, the British Ambassador to
Indonesia, regarded Dr. Sastroamidjojo as "cut[ting] little political
ice" and expressed puzzlement over the Tunku's strong reactions.  In
any case, the British felt that Dr. Sastroamidjojo's remarks were
moderate, making the Tunku's reactions "rather provocative" to the
Indonesians in comparison.  Concerning Subandrio's statements, the
Foreign office believed that The Straits Times had "seriously
misrepresented" them.
Fortunately for both Malaya and the British, the incident was
shortlived. But signs of divergence between the Tunku and the British
were already evident. The above account also suggests that the British
were already active diplomatically even before the Brunei revolt, to
ensure that there was no external opposition to the formation of
Malaysia.
The conventional view was that the British response to Konfrontasi was
primarily a military one is at variance to the British actions prior
to and following the onset of Konfrontasi. Even before the Brunei
Revolt of 1962, the British were active diplomatically. British
Intelligence had alerted Whitehall that Indonesia was opposed to the
Malaysia plan, and had designs on the Borneo territories. Thus, they
tried to restrain the Tunku from making remarks, which were seen as
censorious to Indonesia. The reason behind the British actions was to
ensure that there would be no open declaration of opposition to the
Malaysia scheme. The British did not want the Indonesians to have an
excuse to declare their opposition in public.
The Brunei Revolt provided ample sparks for Indonesia to declare
publicly its opposition to Malaysia, citing the excuse that the
Malaysia plan did not have the support of the peoples of Borneo. That
the revolt was successfully quelled by the British added fuel to the
Indonesian charge. Thus, the aftermath of the revolt saw a flurry of
British diplomatic actions aimed at dousing the flames the revolt
generated.  While they suspected Indonesian complicity in the revolt,
the British were anxious to diffuse tensions between Indonesia and
Malaya, thereby stopping Indonesia from making a public declaration of
its opposition to Malaysia. In this, the British were frustrated by
the war of words between the Tunku and Sukarno, which served
eventually to impede British diplomatic efforts in preventing the
onset of Konfrontasi.  This is at variance with Poulgrain's thesis,
which argues that the British had a hand in instigating Konfrontasi to
serve their interests.
The British were actively mediating between the Tunku and Indonesia in
the revolt's aftermath, which contrasted with the war of words between
Tunku, Subandrio and Sukarno. Nonetheless, the British were able to
play a part in putting the flames under control until end 1962. The
person largely responsible was Sir Leslie Fry, the British Ambassador
to Indonesia. The year 1962 thus ended with the easing of tensions
between Indonesia and Malaya. This was in no small part facilitated by
the British in their mediation efforts.
 The Tunku's New Year message was thus a bombshell to the British, for
it contained remarks that were inflammatory to Indonesia:
Malaya achieved independence under stress of Communist insurrection
and "birth of Malaysia" under similar conditions will not deter us
from going ahead with it… Referring to Brunei, the Tunku said that
"certain political parties in Indonesia" were opposed to Malaysia and
"were determined to smother it"… revolt in Brunei was…essentially bid
for power by one man over three Borneo territories with encouragement
from Indonesia.

This was tantamount to accusing Indonesia of open support to Azahari
in the Brunei revolt, something about which the British did not have
sufficient evidence even at that time. The Tunku continued his tirade
against Indonesia in his address to the UNMO party meeting at Penang
on 1 January, "So far Indonesia has been attacking us with words. So
long as words are used against us we will return compliments in full
measure. But if it comes to hot war in which guns and bullets are used
we are helpless".   While Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of
Singapore regarded the above statement as an admission of weakness,
the British were concerned that the Tunku's public statements would be
provocative to Indonesia, and therefore urged restraint.
 Tunku's remarks re-ignited the war of words between Malaya and
Indonesia, as seen in Sukarno's and Subandrio's speeches on 16 and 17
January respectively.  Again, the British attempted to mediate by
summoning Diah, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom.  Even
so, the British were unable this time to prevent Indonesia's public
declaration of opposition to Malaysia. The Tunku's statements made in
January thus provided the final impetus for the public pronouncement
of Indonesia's opposition to the Malaysia plan, or Konfrontasi. On 20
January 1963, Dr. Subandrio announced Konfrontasi against the Malaysia
plan.
With the commencement of Konfrontasi, the British had to undertake a
military response. The British initially adopted a "wait and see"
approach, discounting the possibility of an immediate military threat.
This contrasted with the Tunku's assessments. Thus, the 72-hour alert
of Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as a precautionary measure was more
to allay the Tunku's fears, than to meet an actual threat posed by
Indonesia. Throughout 1963, there was little military action except
for sporadic incursions, which were dealt relatively easily by the
British forces in Borneo under the command of General Walter Walker.
This was a testimony to the success and effectiveness of the British
military presence.
The British diplomatic response, however, was not as successful. The
limited success in their diplomacy towards Konfrontasi contributed to
the assumption that the British response to Konfrontasi was mainly
military. In reality, the British were very active diplomatically,
albeit in a covert fashion.  This came in the form of diplomatic
representations to the Indonesian leaders, as well as requesting the
good offices of countries with close ties with Indonesia, such as the
United States, Australia and India. The unfolding of events and the
attitude of the Tunku and Sukarno towards the British made them
realise the impotency of their diplomatic efforts.
At first, the British acted as though they were ‘in control’ of the
events, and as the ‘shaper’ of events. However, with the unfolding of
events, the British realized how limited their political influence was
in the region. This was best manifested in the Manila meetings, where
they had been excluded.  Thus, from a supposed ‘driver’ seat, the
British awoke to the reality that they were merely concerned
passengers. That they were concerned with the events can be seen from
the amount of correspondence between the Ambassadors and London on
what went on in Indonesia throughout the period of Konfrontasi.
Throughout the first nine months of Konfrontasi, the British were
constantly irritated by the shifting stands of both the Tunku and
Sukarno. According to Lee Kuan Yew, the Tunku was acting out of his
fear of Sukarno.  The Tunku was also constrained by the domestic
politics of Malaya, in that he needed to demonstrate that he was ready
to defend the territorial interests of Malaya. The mutual dislike
between the Tunku and Sukarno further influenced their respective
actions. Sukarno was even more bound by domestic forces than the
Tunku, having to balance between the divisive forces of the Army and
the PKI. Thus, the attitudes and responses of the Tunku and Sukarno
played a large part in limiting the success and effectiveness of
British diplomatic response vis-a-vis their military response to
Konfrontasi.
In the end, Konfrontasi did not impede the formation of Malaysia.
However, it did marked the success of Indonesia in
“internationalizing” the issue of Malaysia and the British failure in
making this a “low key” internal affair. It also presented to the
British a rude reminder of their limited political influence in
shaping the future of the region. British responses to Konfrontasi
were inexorably linked to the desire to see the fruition of the
Malaysia plan. The common perception was that it was primarily
military. It has been shown that this was not the case. The British
response to Konfrontasi was in fact primarily diplomatic, although its
apparent successes were chiefly military.